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THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF 
COLOR-BLINDNESS: LEARNING TO 
TIllNK AND TALK ABOUT RACE, AGAINt 
CHARLES R. LAWRENCE 111* 
It is 1948. I am sitting in a kindergarten classroom at the Dalton 
School, a fashionable and progressive New York City private school. My 
parents, both products of a segregated Mississippi school system, have 
come to New York to attend graduate and professional school. They 
have enrolled me and my sisters here at Dalton to avoid sending us to 
the public school in our neighborhood where the vast m<tiority of the 
students are black and poor. They want us to escape the ravages of 
segregation, New York style. 
It is circle time in the five-year-old group, and the teacher is 
reading us a book. As she reads, she passes the book around the circle 
so that each of us can see the illustrations. The book's title is Little 
Black Sambo. Looking back, I remember only one part of the story, one 
illustration: Little Black Sambo is running around a stack of pancakes 
with a tiger chasing him. He is very black and has a minstrel's white 
mouth. His hair is tied up in many pigtails, each pigtail tied with a 
different color ribbon. I have seen the picture before the book reaches 
my place in the circle. I have heard the teacher read the "comical" text 
describing Sambo's plight and have heard the laughter of my class-
mates. There is a knot in the pit of my stomach. I feel panic and shame. 
I do not have the words to articulate my feelings-words like "stereo-
type" and "stigma" that might help cathart the shame and place it 
outside of me where it began. But I am slowly realizing that, as the only 
black child in the circle, I have some kinship with the tragic and ugly 
hero of this story-that my classmates are laughing at me as well as at 
him. I wish I could laugh along with my friends. I wish I could disap-
pear. 
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I am in a vacant lot next to my house with black friends from the 
neighborhood. We are listening to Amos and Andy on a small radio 
and laughing uproariously. My father comes out and turns off the 
radio. He reminds me that he disapproves of this show that pokes fun 
at Negroes. I feel bad-less from my father's reprimand than from a 
sense that I have betrayed him and myself, that I have joined my 
classmates in laughing at us. 
I am certain that my kindergarten teacher was not intentionally 
racist in choosing Little Black Sambo. I knew even then, from a child's 
intuitive sense, that she was a good, well-meaning person. A less benign 
combination of racial mockery and profit motivated the white men 
who produced the radio show and played the roles of Amos and Andy. 
But we who had joined their conspiracy by our laughter had not 
intended to demean our race. 
A dozen years later I am a student at Haverford College. Again, I 
am a token black presence in a white world. A companion whose face 
and name I can't remember seeks to compliment me by saying, "I don't 
think of you as a Negro." I understand his benign intention and accept 
the compliment. But the knot is in my stomach again. Once again, I 
have betrayed myself. 
This happened to me more than a few times. Each time my 
interlocutor was a good, liberal, white person who intended to express 
feelings of shared humanity. I did not yet understand the racist impli-
cations of the way in which those feelings were conceptualized. I am 
certain that my white friends did not either. We had not yet grasped 
the compliment'S underlying premise: To be thought of as a Negro is 
to be thought of as less than human. We were all victims of our 
culture's racism. We had all grown up on Little Black Sambo and Amos 
and Andy. 
Another ten years pass. I am thirty-three. My daughter, Maia, is 
three. I greet a pink-faced, four-year-old boy on the steps of her nursery 
school. He proudly presents me with a book he has brought for his 
teacher to read to the class. "It's my favorite," he says. The book is a 
new edition of Little Black Sambo. 
It has been almost ten years since I first told this story. Some of 
you have heard the story before. It appears in the prologue of my 1987 
Stanford Law Review article on unconscious racism.} I tell it again today 
because there are always new lessons in stories, as well as old ones that 
have new meanings in different times and places. I have wanted to 
revisit this work for some time now, to think about why it is that we 
1 Charles R Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). 
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continue to be so confused in the way we think and talk about race 
and racism. As I began to prepare this talk, I returned to the Stanford 
article and to this story and found there an old lesson and a new one. 
The old lesson was the subject of the Stanford article.2 It is a lesson 
about the ubiquity of the disease of racism in this country where, even 
in the most benign of settings, our children learn the lessons of white 
supremacy. 
The new lesson is one that tries to explain why the disease of 
racism continues to flourish and spread despite our professed commit-
ment to its eradication. If racism is a societal disease, how might an 
epidemiologist investigate the mechanisms by which it remains viru-
lent? What phenomena would she identify? What cultural practices 
contribute to its spread? Are there patterns of behavior that are analo-
gous to those found in other epidemics? 
My intuition, my hypothesis, is that an important phenomenon 
contributing to racism's resistance to cure is a condition that I call 
"color-blindness".3 The primary mechanism by which "color-blindness" 
sustains itself is denial. The cultural practice that enables and sustains 
this denial is a societal taboo against honest talk about what we see, 
feel, and know about racism.4 
First, a brief review of the old lesson. 
*** 
'The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Uncon-
scious Racism"5 was a critique of the constitutional doctrine of discrimi-
natory purpose. This doctrine, first established in the 1976 decision of 
Washington v. Davis,6 requires plaintiffs challenging the racist effect of 
2 This article is a critique of the doctrine of discriminatory purpose established by the 
Supreme Court decision of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). That case required plaintiffs 
to affirmatively show intentional racial discrimination in order prove a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. This article argues ~at such a requirement ignores much of what we under-
stand about human psychology and about the profound effect of our history on the individual 
and collective unconscious of the American people. See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
S In employing the medical metaphors of epidemiology and disease I run the risk of using 
language that perpetuates and participates in an ideology that subordinates differently·abled 
people and treats them as if they were sick and in need of cure. A blind graduate student at 
Brandeis listened to an e<l!"lier version of this talk and brought this risk to my attention. I am 
indebted to her for this insight and grateful for her honesty and care in speaking to me about 
my own insensitivity to this issue. 
4 See CORNEL WEST, RACE MATfERS 1-8 (1993) (arguing that race is a taboo subject in 
America). See generaUy Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, FqretJ)qrd: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy 
in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L. BLACK LJ. 1 (1989) (discussing how the taboo surrounding race 
affects legal education); RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA Hu..L, 
CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). 
5 Lawrence, supra note 1. 
6426 U.S. at 239. 
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a facially neutral law to prove a racially discriminatory purpose on the 
part of those responsible for the law's enactment or administration.' 
I argued that requiring proof of conscious or intentional motiva-
tion as a prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is 
race-dependent ignores much of what we understand about how the 
human mind works. It disregards both the irrationality of racism and 
the profound effect that the history of American race relations has had 
on the individual and collective unconscious. 
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in 
which racism has played, and still plays, a dominant role. Because of 
this shared heritage, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and 
beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce 
negative feelings and opinions about non-whites. To the extent that 
this cultural belief system has influenced us all, we are all racists. At 
the same time most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not 
recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced 
our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect 
our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces 
racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.s 
As a law professor challenging the Supreme Court's intent doc-
trine, my chief purpose in writing the Stanford article was to demon-
strate that the professed purposes of the equal protection clause could 
not be fulfilled if only actions motivated by conscious racial bias vio-
lated the Constitution.9 My analysis remained largely within the frame-
work of existing equal protection doctrine and theory, a doctrine and 
theory dominated by concern for formal equality.lo 
But the article was also part of a larger and more important 
project. This is the project of anti-racism, of anti-subordination, and 
human liberation. I hoped that I could make some small contribution 
to that project by helping my readers better understand the disease 
that is American racism. I wanted to convey how we all participate in 
7 Id. 
S Lawrence, supra note 1, at 322. 
9 It was my expectation that my readers would be limited to a small group of Constitutional 
scholars whose primary concern was interpreting and occasionally shaping judicial decisions. 
With hindsight, I think the article is overly influenced by my anticipation of the concerns of that 
readership. I was pleasantly surprised when the article found a significant audience beyond these 
rather narrow confines. 
10 See generaUy Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimi· 
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (discussing 
the way in which the Equal Protection doctrine focuses on the fit between means and ends rather 
than on achieving substantive equality). See al5oJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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the transmission and internalization of racist cultural symbols that 
inflict dehumanizing psychic injury, how we act on those meanings to 
produce and maintain institutional and structural racism,11 how we are 
all dehumanized by these mutually reinforcing symbols, acts, institu-
tions, and structures. This is the old lesson in the story. 
The new lesson has the same purpose as the old. It is part of the 
same project. I ask the epidemiologist's questions. Why does this dis-
ease continue to flourish and spread? I have identified the phenome-
non of "color-blindness" as one cause. The origin of color-blindness is 
benign. We see it first injustice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.12 
''The Constitution is color-blind ... " he said.13 He was obviously stating 
an ideal, a mandate, a standard against which the Constitution will 
judge the state of affairs in a racist world. It is, after all, Justice Harlan 
who first articulated the central lesson of Brown v. Board of Education14 
when he said in Plessy that the "real meaning" of segregation is "that 
colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be 
allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens. "15 
It was not until well after Brown established Justice Harlan's dissent 
as the law of the land that color-blindness was transformed from a 
healing prescription into a carrier of the disease itself.16 If the equal 
protection clause required the disestablishment of racist meanings, 
11 For examples of scholarship describing institutional and structural racism, see Crenshaw, 
supra note 4 (racism in law schools); DERRICK A. BELL,]R., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw, 
712-27 (3d ed. 1992) (racism in labor markets and housing markets);]oNATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE 
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991) (racism in education); STEPHEN ]. 
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) (racism in biology). 
12 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
IS "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. n 
[d. at 559 (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
14 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See Charles L. Black, ]r., The Lawfulness of the Segregation 
Decisions, 69 YALE LJ. 421 (1960) (arguing that in Brown, the Court should have held that 
segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause because of its caste-reinforcing purpose, not 
because segregation psychologically harms black children). See also Lawrence, supra note 1, at 
362-63 (arguing that the stigmatizing "cultural meaning" of segregation makes it inherently 
violative of equal protection). 
15 Plessy, 163 U.S at 560 (Harlan,]., dissenting); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re--reading 
Justice Harlan ~ Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. 
REv. 961, 969 (1992). Aleinikoff argues that Harlan did not view racial classifications to be the 
constitutional violation in Plessy; rather, Harlan believed that segregation laws violate Equal 
Protection because they are assertions of white supremacy. 
16 See generaUy Freeman, supra note 10 (arguing that civil rights law in the twenty-five years 
after Brown has served more to rationalize the continuing effects of racial discrimination, than 
to produce any genuine liberation from race and class oppression). See also Bell, supra note 11; 
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Consti-
tution is Colorblind, "44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991). 
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practices and institutions, that disestablishment could not occur with-
out giving affirmative attention to those meanings and practices. This 
is the meaning of affirmative action. One cannot desegregate a segre-
gated school by ignoring the race of those seeking admission. l7 But 
affirmative action made it apparent that one could not achieve equal 
opportunity without some redistribution of opportunity.18 Of course 
this redistribution was resisted. The resistance took the form of anti-
affirmative action politics and what became known as "reverse discrimi-
nation" litigation.19 The transformation of color-blindness from pre-
scriptive ideal into a condition of societal denial first appeared in these 
anti-affirmative action cases and in the politics that created those 
cases.20 
The transformation is achieved by the assertion that Justice Har-
lan's ideal has nO'w become real. "Our Constitution is color-blind" 
becomes ''We are a color-blind society. "21 Such an assertion can only be 
believed if we engage in massive denial of what we see and hear every 
day. Thus when the Supreme Court struck down the Richmond Vir-
ginia minority set-aside program in Croson,22 the majority opinion 
found that there was "no direct evidence of race discrimination 
[against minority contractors] on the part of the city ... or any evi-
dence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against mi-
17 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see also Regents 
ofUniv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan,j., dissenting); Bakke v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1156 (1976) (Tobriner,j., dissenting). 
18 For a general discussion of how affirmative action functions to redistribute opportunity, 
see WEST, supra note 4, at 63--67. See also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. 
REv. 1710 (1993) (arguing that affirmative action programs can best be defended by a principle 
of distributive justice). 
19 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265; City of Richmond v.jA. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); DeFunis 
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (the forerunner of Bakke). 
20 See CHARLES R LAWRENCE III & JOEL DREYFUSS, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF 
INEQUALITY 141-61 (1979). 
21 justice Powell's opinion in Bakke noted: 
[I]t was no longer possible to peg the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the struggle for equality of one racial minority. During the dormancy of the Equal 
Protection Clause, the United States had become a Nation of minorities. Each had 
to struggle--and to some extent struggles still-to overcome the prejudices not of 
a monolithic majority, but a 'majority' composed of various minority groups of 
whom it was said-perhaps unfuirly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was 
a willingness to disadvantage other groups. (citations omitted). 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292; Also see justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson: 'The dissent's watered-
down version of equal protection review effectively assures that race will always be relevant in 
American life, and that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminating entirely from governmental decision-
making such irrelevant factors as a human being's race' will never be achieved." Croson, 488 U.S. 
at 495 (citing Wygant v. jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986». 
22488 U.S. at 469. 
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nority-owned subcontractors."23 The Court's mcyority blinds itself to 
Richmond's history of slavery and segregation.24 It refuses to see the 
city's still segregated neighborhoods and segregated schools. The Jus-
tices deny their own life experiences in clubs, communities and jobs 
where blacks are rarely seen.25 And if these realities are brought to their 
attention they say, ''but this is not evidence,"26 or "this is economics, 
23 Id. at 480. 
24 In his Croson dissent, Justice Marshall describes the extended history of Richmond's 
discriminatory practices. Id. at 544-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Peter Charles Hoffer, 
"Blind to History:» The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another Look at City of Richmond 
v.fA. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS LJ. 270, 278-79 (1992). Hoffer, an historian, argues that courts 
should use "humanistic historical reasoning" rather than the categorical historical analysis em-
ployed by the Court in Croson. Categorical historical analysis seeks to narrow the historical record 
and context of a case, while humanistic historical reasoning situates cases within a more expansive 
and wider historical and social context. Professor Hoffer summarizes the historical record of 
discrimination against African-American contractors in Richmond: 
The majority of the City Council knew and the federal courts were told that 
non-minority contractors had for a century prevented African-American craftsmen 
from becoming businessmen, refusing them loans and finding other ways to keep 
them out of the larger marketplace (servicing the African-American market was 
permitted), while using their labor. From the moment of the emancipation of slaves 
in Richmond, African-American craftsmen had proven themselves able and success-
ful workmen. Richmond was built, repaired, and rebuilt by minority labor. They 
had joined eagerly in the union movement and were strongly committed to eco-
nomic and political reform. When 'Redeemers' recaptured the government of the 
City and the state for the Democratic Party, they used the race issue to sever 
incipient alliances between white and African-American craftspeople and con-
demned African-American workers to 'low prestige and low paying jobs.' The 
alliance that was to dominate city government and the awarding of city contracts 
was that between an old Virginia economic elite and a lily-white city council. While 
some of this elite circle believed that African Americans ought to be allowed equality 
in farming and trade pursuits (so long as they were willing to acceptJim Crow laws), 
there was no place for African-American businessmen outside of the African-Ameri-
can community. That attitude persisted through the end of a white-dominated City 
Council in 1978 and continues among the white minority of the Council and its 
supporters in the corporate business community. 
Id. at 289-90 (citations omitted). 
25 A full treatment of the background of the individual Justices on the Court is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Nevertheless, accounts of several Justices point to the their infrequent 
interaction with African Americans. Justices Anthony Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and Harry Black-
mun, for example, all have been criticized for their membership in historically exclusionary clubs. 
See Katherine Bishop, Exclusionary Club May Pose Problems for Judge Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14,1987, atA8. 
During the nomination process, Chief Justice Rehnquist was sharply criticized for having 
purchased two homes with racially restrictive covenants and for personally challenging Hispanic 
and black voters' rights to vote at the polls during the early 1960s. Valid Doubts about Justice 
Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1986, atA26;Justice Knew of Deed in '74, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1986, 
at A13. See also Daniel G. Lugo, Don't Believe the Hype: Affirmative Action in Large Law Firms, 11 
LAw & INEQ.J. 615 (1993) (discussing the small number of African Americans in large law firms). 
26Tightly circumscribing the evidence to be examined, O'Connor disparages the city's 
justification for affirmative action set-asides, asserting that it is based on an "amorphous" and 
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not race, "27 or "this is protected racist speech, not conduct, "28 or "it is 
not racism when white contractors hire their friends and all of their 
friends just happen to be white,"29 or "maybe black folks don't like 
contracting work."30 And then they say to those who seek affirmative 
remedies for this discrimination, "You must be a racist if you don't 
believe we are a color-blind society. "31 These are all forms of denial. 
The Justices on the Supreme Court are not its only practitioners. 
Denial is a pervasive symptom of contemporary American racism. 
"unsupported" assertion of "societal discrimination." Croson, 488 U.s. at 499, 502. For example, 
statistical evidence offered to support a finding of discrimination-the miniscule percentage of 
black contractors compared to the number of blacks in Richmond-is excluded on the grounds 
of being irrelevant. O'Connor also excludes Congressional findings of nationwide discrimination 
in the construction industry as "extremely limited." Id. at 504. 
27For example, the majority opinion suggests that race-neutral economic barriers in the 
construction industry are the real problem, not discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-10. By 
viewing the problem in Croson as economic, rather than racial, the Court prohibits remedies that 
seek to redistribute opportunity based on race. However, there is a strong argument that a 
race-neutral economic plan will not be effective in remedying the injuries of past and present 
discrimination. See Martin]. Katz, The Economics of Discrimination: Three Fallacies of Croson, 100 
YALE LJ. 1033, 1045-48 (1991) (arguing that race-neutral policies will not necessarily benefit 
victims of discrimination). 
28 R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (holding that crossburning is a form of political 
speech protected by the First Amendment). For a critique of the Court's decision in R.A. v., see 
Charles R. Lawrence ill, CrosslJurning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the 
First Amendment, 37 VIU .. L. REv. 787 (1992). See generaUy MARl]. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT 
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AsSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993). 
29 "The city and the District Court also relied on evidence that MBE membership in local 
contractors' associations was extremely low. Again, standing alone this evidence is not probative 
of any discrimination in the local construction industry." Croson, 488 U.S. at 503; also see Judge 
Posner's argument that immigrants who hire only among their friends should be exempt from 
anti-discrimination laws. EEOC v. Consolidated Servo Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1993) ("It 
would be a bitter irony if the federal agency dedicated to enforcing the antidiscrimination laws 
succeeded in using those laws to kick these people off the ladder [of American success] by 
compelling them to institute costly systems of hiring"). 
so See Consolidated Servo Sys., 989 F.2d at 238. But if. Katz, supra note 27, at 1044 (disproving 
the assertion that blacks prefer working in lower paying industries). 
31 See Gary Peller, Race Consiousness, 1990 DUKE LJ. 758, 772-79 (1990). Peller argues that 
the liberal ideology of integration has defined racism to mean the possession of race conscious 
thinking: 
Anyone can engage in racism because we identify racism from a vantage point of 
race neutrality, of not making someone's race count for anything. In short, the 
symmetry of the integrationist picture is rooted in the idea that racism consists of 
possessing a race consciousness about the world, in thinking that race should make 
a difference in social relations. 
Id. at 773. Columnist Clint Bolick's editorials vilifying Lani Guinier for being conscious of race 
in America exemplifY this ideology. "At bottom, what is most disturbing about Ms. Guinier's views 
is the pervasiveness of the racial prism through which she views every issue." Clint Bolick, Role 
of the Legal Philosophy that Produced Lani Guinier, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1993, at A15. 
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This kind of massive denial is not possible unless there is also a 
strictly enforced taboo against speaking publicly about that which we 
do not wish to see. In dysfunctional families, where there is alcoholism, 
abuse, or incest, children and other family members learn that they 
are not to speak of this behavior to others.32 Often the behavior is not 
even spoken of within the family.33 These taboos may be enforced by 
threat of further abuse, but they are also enforced by fear of loss of 
love, or guilt, or a diminished self-worth that leads the child to think 
he deserves the abuse, or to the child's participation in the denial.34 
Analogous mechanisms serve to enforce the taboo against speaking 
candidly about what we see and know about racism. 
*** 
It is early April of 1994. I am watching the Midwest regional final 
of the N.C.A.A. basketball championship, fondly known as ''The 
Dance." Michigan is playing Arkansas. The winner will go on to the 
Final Four. ''The Dance" has become a national ritual of sorts. Last year 
more people watched the Final Four than the Superbowl or the World 
Series. I am rooting for the Arkansas Razorbacks. They've been my 
team since the beginning of the season. I love the way they play, but I 
know I'm pulling for them because of their coach, Nolan Richardson. 
Nolan Richardson is black. I am sure that my affinity for Coach 
Richardson has its origins in my childhood experience as a little boy 
who sat down to televised sports events and pulled for the team with 
one black player, if there was one. Schools like Arkansas, Duke, Ken-
tucky, and Louisville didn't even have Italian kids playing for them, 
much less black ones. 
Now the racism in the N.C.A.A., and the racial symbols that signal 
its presence, are more subtle, more complex. Most of the players at 
''The Dance" are black, and there are a handful of black coaches.35 In 
32 See, e.g.,juuE BLACKMAN, INTIMATE VIOLENCE 9 (1989) ("Those who have felt embarrassed 
after having had a personal problem revealed to them have an intuitive understanding of what 
it means for a problem to be 'taboo.'"); AMA COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 7 (1991); THE DARK SIDE OF FAMIUES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE REsEARCH 131 (D. 
Finke1hor et. al eds., 1983) (cited in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2828 (1992». 
33 See Planned Parentlwod v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2828 (describing domestic violence survivors' 
reluctance to report the offender). 
34 See WILLIAM STACEY & ANSON SHUPE, 'THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMER-
ICA 72 (1983) ("paradoxically, even if [the children] were abused themselves by their father, 
children may still love him"). 
35 See Richard Lapchick, Finally, A Small Step in the Right Direction, SPORTING NEw·s,jan. 31, 
1994, at 8. 
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the weeks leading up to the tournament, the Black Coaches Associa-
tion, led by black basketball coaches like Richardson, threatened a 
boycott of the N.C.A.A.36 They were calling attention to a number of 
N.CA.A. policies and practices that they felt limited the opportunities 
of young black athletes.37 These coaches are what my Dad used to call 
"race men." Being a "race man" has nothing to do with not liking white 
folks. It has a lot do with loving black folks and yourself. A. Philip 
Randolph and Thurgood Marshall were "race men." Clarence Thomas 
is not. 
I am rooting for Arkansas because when I look at Coach Richard-
son, he reminds me of my Dad and Justice Marshall. He is a serious, 
dignified man who has risen to the top of his profession by virtue of 
his genius and his humanity. He cares deeply for the young men he 
teaches. He has high expectations for them and demands much of 
them. Richardson is a brilliant coach. He has one of the best win/loss 
records of any coach currently coaching in Division I basketbalp8-but 
you don't hear his name mentioned when people talk about great 
basketball minds. Sports writers call him a "good recruiter" and a 
"motivator." The kids on his teams are "great natural athletes." The 
T.V. commentators don't use words like "discipline" and "execution" 
when they talk about Richardson's team. Arkansas plays "street ball." 
Rick Petino's Kentucky team plays "up tempo."39 Nolan Richardson 
knows that there is racial meaning in these words. This is why I am 
rooting for Arkansas. 
The President of the United States is also watching the game. He's 
right there in the stands and he too is screaming for the Razorbacks. 
The week before, Bill Clinton was on the cover of Sports Illustrated in 
an Arkansas sweatshirt. A long story in the magazine described how 
the "first fan" sits and screams at the T.V. set when his beloved Hogs 
are playing.4o 
The final buzzer sounds. Arkansas has won. The arena in Dallas 
is in pandemonium and the nation's Chief Executive is walking briskly 
to mid-court to meet Coach Nolan Richardson. He gives the coach a 
36 See Gene Wojciechowski, BCA Cauld Cau Timeout During the Tournament, SPORTING NEWS, 
Mar. 28, 1994, at 47; Steve Berkowitz, Viewpoints Face Different Directirms: Baycott Highlights Gap, 
WASH. POST,Jan. 14, 1994, at C6; Malcolm Moran, Baycott Threat Reflects Power Struggle in Colleges. 
N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 13, 1994, at B9. 
37 See Lapchick, supra note 35, at 8 (discussing the various issues raised by the black coaches). 
ss See Michael Wilbon, Arkansas' Coach is No Pig in Poke, WASH. POST. March 27. 1994. at 
D9. 
39Id.; see also Alexander Wolff, Razor Sharp, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED. Apr. 11. 1994, at 20. 
40 See Alexander Wolff, The First Fan, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 21, 1994, at 24. 
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two-handed high five, bumping his chest in a moment of spontaneous, 
joyful exhilaration, and then, in full view of the Reunion Arena and 
millions of television viewers, the two men hug, a bear hug. 
I am not feeling exhilarated. I'm feeling conflicted. Happy for the 
Hogs. Happy for their strong, dignified black coach. But I am not 
feeling happy for the country or for the state of race relations. I am 
trying to understand why this is so. Mter all, isn't this the scene I 
dreamt of when I was a kid searching for that one black ballplayer on 
the screen? Isn't it the scene that Charles Houston and Thurgood 
Marshall might have envisioned when they began the long line of 
litigation that culminated in Brown v. Board of Education? Isn't this the 
scene we imagined as we sat in and went to jail so that black and white 
young people could play on the same basketball courts and cheer in 
the same stands in arenas in Dallas, Atlanta, and Charlotte? 
I'm feeling conflicted because I know it's more complicated than 
that. And I'm feeling empathy for Nolan Richardson because I'm sure 
he knows it too. This scene looks like a color-blind world, and I think 
maybe in the brief moment of that two-handed-high-five Bill Clinton 
believes it really is. But my gut is telling me I know better, and so is 
Coach Richardson's. What if Coach Richardson were to ask the Presi-
dent to support the Black Coaches Association in the scholarship 
dispute? What if the black players on both teams had raised black-
gloved fists above their heads during the playing of the national an-
them41 to protest the fact that blacks are unemployed at two and 
one-half times the rate of whites, or that blacks are three times more 
likely to have income below the poverty level? Would it still look like a 
color-blind world? 
The President's hug reminds me of my friend Lani Guinier. I am 
thinking of the now famous picture of the President and his wife at 
her wedding. The story of the withdrawal of Professor Guinier's nomi-
nation to the post of Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights is an 
ideal case history for an epidemiologist studying the phenomena of 
color-blindness and taboo.42 A cartoon by Village Voice43 cartoonist 
Mark Alan Stamaty captures the essence of this case. 
41 Symbolically protesting American racism during the 1968 Olympic Gantes, two African-
American athletes, Tommy Smith and John Carlos, raised black-gloved fists high above their 
bowed heads during the playing of the United States national anthem at their medal ceremony. 
42 See Lani Guinier, Who:S Afraid of Lani Guinier, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 27, 1994, at 41 
(discussing the events leading up to Clinton's withdrawal of Guinier's candidacy for assistant 
attorney general of the Civil Rights Division). 
43 Reprinted with permission of cartoonist Mark Alan Stamaty, WASH. POST, MAR. 28, 1994, 
atA21. 
¥(ASHiNGT~@N® © .Uark Alan Siamal)" 
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Professor Guinier's work embraces the ideal of color-blindness, 
where that ideal means full recognition of our shared humanity, but 
she refuses to ignore the continuing presence of racial subordination. 
She wanted to talk honestly about the disease she saw in the American 
family.44 She refused to participate in the collective denial that is rep-
resented by the Supreme Court's opinion in the Croson case and 
Clinton's hug at mid-court. She broke the taboo that says thou shalt 
not speak of the disease when you see it. And so she was sanctioned: 
called "a madwoman" and "loony Lani," "left wing extremist," and 
"quota queen. "45 
What makes Stamaty's cartoon so brilliant, so funny and sad, is 
that it captures the essence of denial. The character who is shouting 
down Professor Guinier is depicted in a way that calls to mind a spoiled 
child. He is behaving the way children do when, in a quite se1f.con-
scious way, they don't want to hear what is being said to them. If they 
just shout something else loud enough, something like "liar, liar, pants 
on fire," they won't have to hear the bad news about their own behav-
ior. 
In this classic form of denial, reality is turned on its head. The 
individual who calls our racism to our attention is called a racist. Her 
refusal to participate in our charade, that the ideal of color-blindness 
is present reality, is asserted as conclusive evidence that she does not 
believe in the ideal. She is silenced, depicted as "loony," as "outside the 
mainstream." Thus the illusion created by denial is maintained. The 
President participated in this denial and in the enforcement of the 
taboo when he claimed he was withdrawing Professor Guinier's nomi-
nation, not in response to right-wing political pressure, but as a matter 
of principle, because, he found her ideas "anti-democratic. "46 By calling 
attention to the continued existence of racialized politics, Guinier had 
44 See Guinier, supra note 42, at 43-44. Guinier writes, "The American people needed to move 
beyond ... racial polarization. We should not be afraid of speaking directly to the continuing 
problems that our racial history creates for the civic life of our country. Silence won't make the 
problem go away." Id. 
45 The New Yorker chronicled some of the attacks on Professor Guinier: the Wall Street 
Journal described her as one of "Clinton's Quota Queens;" The U.S. News & World Report 
asserted that Guinier "does not share the goal of a colorblind society. She is not an integrationist;" 
The New York Times reported that Guinier stands for "racial polarization" and for "setting black 
and white politically and legally apart;" The New York Post concluded that she is a "hard·left 
extremist;" The New Republic wrote that Guinier is "a firm believer in the racial analysis of an 
irreducible, racial 'us' and 'them' society." Comment: Idea Woman, NEwYoRKER,June 14, 1993, 
at 4. 
46 See Text of President Clinton's Comments on Withdrawal of Guinier Nomination, WASH. POST, 
June 4,1993, atAI0 [hereinafter Clinton Text]; Dan Balz, Decision Played Out as a Painful Rerun: 
For the President, Latest Embarrassment is Both Personal and Politica~ WASH. POST, June 4, 1993, 
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broken the taboo. Clinton said that when he nominated her he hadn't 
carefully read her work.47 Now he had read it and discovered that her 
views on race conscious remedies for voting rights violations were 
inconsistent with his belief in a color-blind democracy. It was as if he 
were saying, ''Look at the wedding picture. I thought she was color-
blind like me." 
*** 
It is mid-March, the first sunny, warm day after a long, hard winter. 
My friend Stephen Arons is visiting me in Washington. We are walking 
in Rock Creek Park with my three-month old daughter, Kimiko, and 
my dog, Maceo. Our conversation is the intense, intimate, truth-speak-
ing talk that makes one thankful for good friends. We speak of siblings 
and parents, of grown children and this new baby in the stroller, of 
marriages past and present, of seders and baptisms, of Hebron48 and 
Crown Heights,49 of Dr. Baruch Goldstein50 and Minister Louis Farrak-
han.51 There is no color-blindness in this conversation, no denial, no 
taboo. 
Steve asks me if I have thought about how I will handle the 
questions about Farrakhan which he thinks will inevitably be asked 
when I give this talk at Brandeis University. I smile at my good Jewish 
friend. I know that he feels in some way responsible for me, having 
suggested my name to the organizers of the Brandeis lecture. I am 
appreciative of and amused by his concern. I also know that he is right 
to anticipate the land mines that rest half-buried in the complex 
confluence of America's racism and its anti-semitism. 
at AI; David Von Drehle, Lani, We Hardly Knew Ye: The Lawyer Who Burned Briefly-But Too 
Brightly For Her Own Good, WASH. POST,June 4,1994, at CI. 
47 See Clinton Text, supra note 46, at 10 ("At the time of the nomination, I had not read her 
writings. In retrospect, I wish I had."). 
48 On February 25, 1994, aJewish settler, Dr. Baruch Goldstein, entered an Islamic holy site 
in Hebron and gunned down twenty-nine Muslim worshippers. The Hebron massacre led to a 
new cycle of violence between Jews and Muslims in Israel and the occupied territories. See David 
Hoffman, Hebron Massacre Triggers Day of Bloodshed, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1994, at AI. 
49 On August 19, 1991 a seven-year-old black boy, Gavin Cato, was killed when a car traveling 
in a Hasidic Jewish motorcade lost control in Crown Heights, New York. A Hasidic operated 
ambulance arrived at the accident scene, picking up only the Hasidic driver, and leaving the boy 
behind. A group of outraged black youths attacked and killed a Hasidic rabbinical student, Yankel 
Rosenbaum. The lingering violence and tension between blacks and Jews in Crown Heights has 
come to symbolize the deteriorating relationship between blacks and Jews in American society. 
SeeJoe Sexton, Crown Hts. Tension Persists Despite Healing Effort, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 27, 1994, at AI. 
50 See Hoffman, supra note 48. 
51 Minister Farrakhan is the controversial leader of the Nation of Islam. 
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I know that on this dangerous ground, where all of us are most 
vulnerable, even good people with a common cause have great 
difficulty trusting each other enough to speak. with candor and to listen 
with courage and care. I know that many of the people in my audience 
will want to hear me condemn Farrakhan, and that no matter how 
unequivocally I condemn him, it will not be enough. I fear that if I 
reveal my tentative efforts to understand how white supremacy is inter-
nalized by its victims, and manifests itself in African-American anti-
semitism, I will be misheard by both Jews and blacks. I know that I will 
be quoted out of context by the press. I am afraid that when the name 
Farrakhan is uttered all else will be forgotten, all other words and ideas 
drowned in the roar of hateful words that have been hurled back and 
forth between my people and Steve's. I tell Steve, "I'm not sure what 
I'll do. I'll have to see how brave I'm feeling." 
Well, I was not feeling all that brave, but my speech called on all 
of us to be courageous, to break. the taboo against speaking of what we 
see. And as Paulo Freire has said, "there is no true word that is not at 
the same time praxis. "52 There is much in the way we talk, and do not 
talk, about anti-semitism among blacks and racism among Jews that is 
illustrative of both myoid lesson about recognizing racism as a disease 
that infects us all, and my new lesson about the epidemiological phe-
nomena of denial and taboo. I want to speak briefly of these. 
The first is that anti-semitism, like white supremist racism, is best 
understood as a societal disease that infects us all. Although they have 
different historical origins, the ways that African Americans and Jewish 
Americans experience these closely related illnesses are uniquely 
shaped by this country's history and culture. 
All of us must condemn outbreaks of anti-semitism. We must 
oppose the neo-Nazi voices of Khalid Muhammad .and David Duke. 
Blacks must be particularly vigilant and outspoken when anti-semitism 
raises its head in our communities, even as Jews must be in the van-
guard of the anti-racist struggle when members of the Jewish commu-
nity are complicit in the American racial caste system. 
But I am concerned that the persistent intensity of the call for 
black leaders to condemn Farrakhan may be indicative of our need to 
think about anti-semitism in the same false way that the law thinks 
about racism. This false way of thinking is seductive because it seems 
to offer a simple solution. If we can isolate and condemn the self-pro-
fessed anti-semite, if we can impose a condemnation litmus test on 
52PAULO FiuERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 75 (1992) (discussing praxis in the context 
of revolutionary education). 
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black leaders, we can be done with it. Anti-semitism, like racism, is 
placed outside of ourselves and located in the "guilty other guy." We 
tell ourselves that most good Americans are not anti-semitic, that there 
is no internalized, self-inflicted anti-semitism among Jews. "If some of 
my best friends are Jews," we say, "how can you accuse me of anti-semi-
tism?" Again, I am not saying we should not condemn the self-pro-
fessed bigot and hold him responsible for his actions. I am saying it is 
not enough. 
The persistent calls for condemnation may also be examples of 
my new lesson at work. They may be a mechanism by which we deny 
the continued existence of widespread anti-semitism in the black com-
munity. They may be a way of avoiding the harder conversations about 
the complex connections between white racism and black anti-semi-
tism. This may be a symptom of color-blindness- acting as if we could 
talk about anti-semitism in this country without talking about white 
racism. When I am asked about Farrakhan and people can hear noth-
ing but the required condemnation, I feel the taboo against honest 
talk of racism at work. It is also a taboo against honest talk of anti-semi-
tism. 
*** 
One last story: it is February of 1994. I am reading the Washington 
Post. A white sixth grade teacher in the D.C. suburb of Montgomery 
County writes about his experience with a class of twenty-nine students, 
of whom all but two were black and Hispanic, and all but three from 
poor families.53 The teacher had shown a film based on a Langston 
Hughes story about a young black boy who attempts to steal the purse 
of an elderly black woman. The boy fails and the woman takes him 
into her home, where she proceeds to apply generous amounts of love 
and understanding to his wounds. The story's lesson is that love is 
powerful medicine and that all of us have it within us to be better 
people. The teacher describes the discussion after the film: 
I turned on the lights and asked if anyone wanted to share 
their reactions to the film. An 'A' student, who is black, raised 
his hand and said, 'You knew something bad was going to 
happen when it started. As soon as you see a black boy you 
know he's gonna do something bad.' 
53Marc Eirich, The Stereotype Within: Why Students Don't Buy Black History Month, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at Cl. The following text appeared in this article. 
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Me: Just because he's black, he's bad?' 
Student: 'Everybody knows that black people are bad. 
That's the way we are.' 
I was becoming a little horrified, both at the answer and 
that it would be coming from him, of all students. I counted 
on the class to rebuke him. To provoke a class response, I 
restated his proposition that 'Black people are bad' and asked 
who agreed with that. Twenty-four of twenty-nine hands went 
up. 
Maybe I was misunderstanding the use of bad. 'Do you 
mean cool or tough or hof2 Or do you mean bad as in not good 
or evil(' I asked. One of the best female students in the class 
assured me she meant the latter, as did everyone else. 
In her view, and in the view of most of my class, black people 
are determined inherently, genetically, naturally, to be bad 
people. To my students, it wasn't a matter of choice, or up-
bringing, but simply a racial attribute. They had no doubt in 
this, nor was this their sole racial stereotype. As the discussion 
continued a disturbing picture of their self-image emerged. 
All of the following comments received a near consensus in 
the class: 
-Blacks are poor and stay poor because they're dumber than 
whites (and Asians). 
-Black people don't like to work hard. 
-Black people have to be bad so they can fight and defend 
themselves from other blacks. 
-As students, they see their badness as natural. They don't 
mean any disrespect to me personally: It's Just how we are.' 
-They don't need to work hard because it won't matter in the 
end. 
-Black men make women pregnant and leave. 
-Black boys expect to die young and unnaturally. 
-"'White people are smart and have money. 
-Asians are smart and make money. 
-Asians don't like blacks or Hispanics. 
-Hispanics are more like blacks than whites. They can't be 
white so they try to be black. 
-Hispanics are poor and don't try hard because, like blacks, 
they know it doesn't matter. They will be like blacks because when 
you're poor you have to be bad to survive. 
-Black kids who do their school work and behave want to be 
white. "'White kids who do poorly or dress cool, want to be blacks. 
17 
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Hispanic kids want to be black because they aren't smart (like 
whites).54 
This is the strange and awful fruit of segregation 1990s style. The 
injury done to these children is the same injury identified in Brown. 
One does not need Kenneth Clark's doll tests to see that the race-
coded messages of American culture have "affected their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. "55 And yet, if one of these 
children brought suit under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court 
would likely say, "There is no direct evidence before us that the school 
district has discriminated against these children. "56 
Before Brown, there were signs on lunch counters, drinking foun-
tains, and bathrooms that said "colored" and "white." Before we de-
clared ourselves color-blind, black parents took their children by the 
hand. They pointed to the signs, to the minstrel shows and the Little 
Black Sambos and said to their children, 'This is not about you. It is 
the white man's problem that he needs to think of you as less than he. 
This is the white man's way of keeping you in your place, of making 
sure you do not get your fair share. This is what he says you are, but 
you are not this person." 
In 1994 the printed signs are gone, but the color-coded messages 
remain. The children see these messages all around them, but the 
Supreme Court, the Congress, the President, the academy, the banks, 
and the businesses claim they see no color there. They are color-blind. 
They deny society's racism and forbid honest talk about it. 
If we are to fight this disease, if we are to stop its spread, we must 
cease denying the reality of racism. We must break the taboo. We must 
be brave enough to recognize our own infection and we must engage 
in honest public talk about what we know and see. 
54Id. 
55 "To separate them [black children] from others of similiar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone". Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
56 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 480. (holding that there was "no direct evidence of race discrimi-
nation" against minority subcontractors). 
